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KAMENEV IN ROME1 
 
 
                    “I am grateful to Rome for the five months I have spent there. . . . 
                      I left Italy in love with her. . . .”2 
                                                                                          Alexander Herzen  
 
The Italian ambassador in Moscow, Giatano Manzoni, reported to his govern-
ment on January 27, 1927 that his newly appointed counterpart, Lev Borisovich 
Kamenev, had departed for Rome that day.
3
 Manzoni added that he would be “trav-
eling via Warsaw,” as though supplying the itinerary confirmed the reality of 
Kamenev’s departure.4 
Manzoni had reason for concern. Kamenev had waited almost three months be-
fore taking up his new post. However reluctant, he was to be the fifth head of mis-
sion and third ambassador to represent the Soviet government in Rome. Among that 
number Kamenev was unique. As Manzoni also reported, Kamenev’s departure had 
involved a send off “by Trotskii and two hundred other persons.”5 The event, in 
other words, was sooner a political demonstration by the Opposition to Stalin than a 
farewell to a diplomat posted abroad. 
Kamenev joined more than two dozen members of the Opposition in diplomatic 
exile, forced upon them by a series of political defeats in the fall of 1926.
6
 He left 
reluctantly, committed to the Opposition’s cause and believing that his place was in 
Moscow rather than in Rome. While experienced in diplomacy, he was not a profes-
sional diplomat as his predecessors had been.
7
 Only two years before he had been 
one of the most powerful figures in the Soviet regime. The Italian government did 
not expect Kamenev to put trade and economic interests before ideology. He did not 
disappoint his hosts. 
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Because Kamenev’s ambassadorship constituted an anomaly and was short lived, 
lasting less than a year, it has been largely overlooked or misinterpreted. But Kame-
nev was not the diplomatic failure that some historians have suggested.
8
 In fact, as I 
will show, he attempted with a measure of success to combine his diplomatic and 
oppositional roles. Although Kamenev served as ambassador until his last major de-
feat at the Fifteenth Party Congress in December 1927, I will also argue that his 
short tenure in Italy laid the foundation for active political work until his arrest in 
December 1934. In the six years left to Kamenev after his return from Rome, he re-
sumed his role as an opponent of Stalin. That role is incomprehensible without ref-
erence to what he learned while ambassador to Italy. 
 
Controversial appointment 
Kamenev told Mussolini at their only known meeting that he was “grateful to get 
away from Russia and from Stalin.”9 Other sources contradict that statement which 
implied that the new ambassador had a choice in the matter. Manzoni suggested that 
Kamenev had been manipulated into taking the position. Kamenev “remained the 
least tactically advanced” by comparison to Trotskii and Zinoviev, the other two 
members of the Opposition triumvirate; and, therefore, was “the only one of the 
three who was sent to a foreign post.”10 Others have suggested, as Kamenev main-
tained to Mussolini, that he had reason to be grateful for the appointment. Stalin had 
systematically eroded Kamenev’s power since 1925. By the summer of 1926, Mi-
koian had replaced him as Commissar of Trade, his last major official appointment. 
There followed the directorship of the Lenin Institute where he was “relegated to 
footnote writing.”11 
Isaac Deutscher offered the opposite interpretation. He argued that Kamenev’s 
appointment demeaned him: “there could be no more frustrating and humiliating as-
signment for the former Chairman of the Politburo.”12 In the end Manzoni accepted 
Kamenev’s version that he still controlled his fate.  According to the Italian ambas-
sador, Kamenev himself had demanded the position, arguing that his profound 
knowledge of the Italian Communist Party or PCI (Partito Communista Italiano) 
made him the logical choice for the post.
13
 
Kamenev must have been filled with ambivalence at the prospect of the posting 
to Rome. His appointment was announced in the second week of November, yet 
through December he avoided meeting both Manzoni and Platon Kirzhentsev, his 
predecessor, who had by then returned to Moscow.  He also, as noted, repeatedly 
delayed his departure. He may have feared assassination, the fate of more than one 
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Soviet diplomat abroad. As an oppositionist, he could be the target of Russian emi-
grés or Stalin’s agents. On the other hand Rome may have appeared more enticing 
than the Lenin Institute. Yet he would be removed from the political fray in Mos-
cow in which he had played a leading role both in power and in the Opposition. 
Kamenev’s ambivalence could best be seen in his speech to the Plenum of the 
Comintern Executive Committee on December 14, 1926. In that speech he reached 
out to the PCI which had recently shown the Opposition a measure of support. He 
also jeopardized his appointment to Rome. Another motive behind the speech was 
Kamenev’s determination to refute Stalin’s address to the group the day before.  
One scholar has described the speech as “flaming,” another as “fiery.” In contrast to 
Stalin, who repeated his argument for socialism in one country, Kamenev spoke in 
favor of world revolution.
14
 He called on the European proletariat to aid in the con-
struction of socialism in the USSR.
15
 He had refused to moderate his position to 
avoid offending the Italian government. 
As might have been expected, Mussolini was furious when he learned of the 
speech. He told Manzoni to inform Litvinov that someone newly appointed as am-
bassador “cannot be excessively appreciated by the Italian government if he has 
publicly upheld the necessity of propaganda for world revolution. . . . The appear-
ance in Rome of Kamenev, who has very nearly discredited his own Government as 
head of the . . . opposition will not serve to improve relations between the two coun-
tries. . . .”16 
It seemed that Mussolini’s worst fears regarding Kamenev had been confirmed. 
Upon hearing of his appointment, the Italian premier had warned his envoy of the 
potential for “excessive political and propagandistic activity by the new Ambassa-
dor and his wife who it would not seem possible to forbid from accompanying her 
husband to Rome.” He added, “we would more willingly have the appointment of a 
career diplomat like Kopp rather than a political figure temporarily in disgrace.”17 
Manzoni tried to reassure Mussolini regarding the new Soviet ambassador.  “I 
have known Kamenev since 1924 and have had a favorable impression. . . . His ap-
pearance and manner are totally bourgeois. His influence in the party and press and 
his competence in affairs of state are not doubted.”18 A few days later he suggested 
that Kamenev’s role in the Opposition had been limited. “The position of Kamenev 
in the opposition has never been as clear as that of Trotskii or Zinoviev. . . . Kame-
nev could even return to the government,”19 Manzoni assured a nervous Mussolini. 
By the end of November, Manzoni could assuage the Duce’s fears concerning 
the woman whom the Italians mistakenly thought to be Kamenev’s wife. “Signora 
Kameneff [sic.] will remain in Moscow.”20 The Italian government was misin-
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formed regarding Kamenev’s household. The new ambassador had been married to 
Trotsky’s sister who, as Manzoni reported, had been “for a number of years director 
of an office for . . . cultural propaganda.”21 The fear that she might continue that 
work in Italy had alarmed Mussolini. Kamenev left for Rome accompanied by his 
second wife T. I. Glebova, who refused an active political role.  
The Italian dictator’s suggestion that Victor Kopp, the Soviet ambassador to Ja-
pan, should serve in Rome derived from someone near at hand. Platon Kirzhentsev, 
the current Soviet ambassador to Rome, “proposed Kopp. . . . He gives me news 
about . . . the ambassador in Tokyo,” Mussolini informed Manzoni.22 The Duce had 
a distinct reason for preferring a professional diplomat like Kopp or Kirzhentsev ra-
ther than Kamenev. 
Kamenev’s lack of diplomatic experience stood at the center of the controversy 
surrounding his appointment.  Ideology might pit Fascism against Bolshevism. Eco-
nomic interests brought Italy and the Soviet Union into partnership. Mussolini drew 
a careful distinction between ideology and expediency. Although the secretary of 
the Fascist party or PNF, Augusto Turati, insisted on the great divide between 
“Rome and Moscow,”23 Mussolini followed the lead of powerful Italian business in-
terests in drawing closer to the Soviet Union. 
Milanese industrialists who had helped to catapult Mussolini into power actively 
supported trade negotiations with the Soviet Union in the early 1920s. They formed 
the Campagnia Industriale Commercio Estero (Society of Industrialists for Foreign 
Trade) or CICE and pressured for diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union. With 
the treaty according the Soviet Union full diplomatic recognition, signed in Febru-
ary 1924, Mussolini observed, “party prejudices cannot have a place” in our diplo-
macy with the Soviet Union “because . . . [with] friendly relations with Russia, we 
will have an open path to the Slavic world.”24 For CICE that path also led to the 
Causasus and Iran. Its members sought to renew their lucrative pre-war banking 
connections with those regions. They sought to assist the Soviet Union’s program of 
modernization.  In turn, by 1926 the Soviet Union supplied most of Italy’s fuel oil. 
The same conflict between ideology and economic expediency prevailed on the 
Soviet side. Kamenev explained the Soviet version of the Moscow-Rome divide 
when he told a Moscow guberniia party conference in 1924 that “Fascism . . . re-
veals . . . the true nature . . . of the bourgeois dictatorship.”25 Such remarks translat-
ed into policy frustrated Soviet diplomats. The highly respected negotiator, V. V. 
Vorovskii, in the midst of serious trade discussions with the Italians, had warned his 
government about Comintern activity in Italy. A propaganda campaign “can push 
such an egotistical and irresponsible man like Mussolini into taking upon himself . . 
. a struggle against . . . Bolshevism. The fate of this question is now in our hands. 
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Choosing one or the other tactic [promoting revolution or encouraging normal rela-
tions] depends on the Politburo...however we decide it...the decision should be clear 
and absolute,” Vorovskii insisted.26 The diplomat clearly hoped that the Comintern 
would cease to undermine his efforts at negotiation. 
Relations between Italy and the Soviet Union had steadily improved because the 
Bolshevik regime supported men like Vorovskii and the Commissar of Foreign 
Trade, L. B. Krasin, whose serious and purposeful negotiations had almost single-
handedly convinced Mussolini to grant the Soviet Union de jure recognition.
27
 
Trade rather than ideology had come to prevail in Soviet-Italian relations. 
1926 was to mark a change. The appointment of numerous oppositionists would 
surely modify the character of the Soviet diplomatic service. Men like Kirzhentsev 
were threatened by that dramatic development. Reason enough for him to connive 
against Kamenev’s appointment and argue for another diplomat to replace him. Sta-
lin may have had his own reasons for selecting Kamenev, a choice he surely over-
saw.
28
 He had harbored particular animosity for his rival ever since the Fourteenth 
Party Congress where Kamenev had denounced Stalin personally.
29
 There was al-
ways the possibility that he could rid himself of Kamenev once and for all. As noted 
above, Soviet diplomats were at particular risk of assassination. Vorovskii was as-
sassinated in Lausanne in May 1923. Krasin constantly faced threats and assassina-
tion attempts.
30
 Stalin may have contemplated such a fate for Kamenev.
31
 
From Kamenev’s perspective the most immediate issue was to reach out to the 
Italian Communist Party or PCI, whether he was in Moscow or Rome. Kamenev 
was suited to the task. Of all the major oppositionists, he had the most extensive 
connections with Italy and Italian culture.
32
 Manzoni’s passing observation that “the 
new Soviet Ambassador . . . was in northern Italy early in the world war [but] does 
not know central or southern . . . Italy” hardly told the real story of Kamenev’s past 
association with Italy which included a lengthy sojourn there in 1913 to conduct re-
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search on his biography of Herzen.
33
 Initially the new ambassador did all in his 
power to belie another observation of Manzoni that in “appearance and manner” he 
was “totally bourgeois.” Kamenev’s first task as ambassador consisted of active 
support for the PCI and for revolution in Italy. 
 
Kamenev and the PCI 
The Opposition triumvirate owed a debt of gratitude to the leadership of the PCI. 
On the eve of the Fifteenth Party Conference in October 1926, Antonio Gramsci 
sent a letter to the Central Committee of the CPSU regarding the impending con-
frontation between Stalin and his opponents. 
Gramsci was uniquely placed to write such a letter. As a member of the Comin-
tern Executive Committee and General Secretary of the PCI, he moved seamlessly 
between the Soviet and Italian Communist parties, enjoying respect that transcended 
his formal responsibilities. Like the leaders of the Opposition, Gramsci was a well-
educated and highly cultured individual. His knowledge of Soviet politics rivaled 
his familiarity with the Italy of Mussolini. He had also served in the Italian parlia-
ment.
34
 
Gramsci’s words carried weight for other reasons. He had repeatedly held re-
sponsible positions with the Comintern Executive Committee, joining that body in 
1922. He knew two members of the Opposition triumvirate well. While he had 
clashed with Zinoviev over issues connected with the merger of the Italian Com-
munist and Socialist parties, he and Trotskii had worked together more amicably in 
the Comintern.
35
 Trotskii included a letter from Gramsci on Italian Futurism in his 
Literatura i revoliutsiia.
36
 Probably no more fitting defender of the Opposition out-
side of the CPSU than Gramsci could be found. 
Gramsci’s letter to the Central Committee made three main points.37 In the devi-
siveness of the Soviet party, Gramsci saw a threat to “the hard won unity of non-
Soviet parties.”38 He offered praise for the Opposition leadership, placing Trotskii, 
Zinoviev, and Kamenev “among our masters.”39 Gramsci’s final point was “to plead 
for restraint in the treatment of the . . . Opposition.”40 He urged “the majority of the 
Central Committee of the CPSU . . . not . . . to abuse its victory in the struggle and   
. . . to avoid excessive measures.”41 
The PCI’s assistance to the Opposition did not end with Gramsci’s letter. At the 
Seventh Plenum of the Comintern Executive Committee, where Kamenev’s speech 
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nearly jeopardized his appointment to Rome, Palmiro Togliatti, the PCI’s delegate 
to the Executive Committee, successfully challenged the attempt to prevent the Op-
position triumvirate from speaking at all.
42
 As a result of Togliatti’s defense, Kame-
nev, along with Trotskii and Zinoviev, was able to denounce Stalin’s doctrine of so-
cialism in one country. 
The PCI in turn saw hope in Kamenev’s appointment. An anonymous report in 
the Italian Ministry of Interior captured the sense of anticipation on the left that pre-
ceded Kamenev’s arrival: “Signor Kameneff comes to Italy with an official mandate 
. . . to inspire energy and courage in the [Italian] organizers of the Third Interna-
tional. According to the Communists, Kameneff is the individual who is necessary 
in Italy at this moment in which reaction reaches its extreme limit. . . . The Com-
munists see something prophetic in the arrival of Kameneff. . . .”43 
Previous Soviet envoys had, as a PCI representative in Moscow complained, 
shown “extraordinary diplomatic opportunism.”44 Two ambassadors, for example, 
K. K. Iurenev and P. M. Kirzhentsev had been reprimanded for lack of revolution-
ary zeal. The former had invited Mussolini to a Soviet diplomatic reception in the 
midst of the Matteotti affair when the Duce faced general opprobrium for possible 
complicity in the murder of the Socialist leader in parliament. The PCI had repeat-
edly protested Soviet efforts to court Mussolini and condemned “the numerous 
compliments which Soviet envoys had addressed personally to the dictator.”45 Ital-
ian Communists expected Kamenev to be different.   
 By the time that the new ambassador arrived in early 1927, the PCI had recently 
sustained two devastating blows. On November 8 Gramsci was arrested; and the 
next day the PCI, along with all other opposition parties, was banned.
46
 Overnight, 
“Italy became a one party state.”47 
Kamenev quickly confirmed the hopes of the PCI that he would be a different 
kind of Soviet ambassador. He no sooner left the cold and indifferent reception by 
Mussolini than he rushed to his first meeting with “important members of the Exec-
utive Committee of the PCI.”48 Kamenev announced to the stunned group that they 
must hold a party congress. Even the much hoped for  Kamenev could misstep. His 
enthusiasm met scant response among the demoralized Italians. They established 
“neither a date nor a location for a convocation.”49 More useful than Kamenev’s 
misplaced advice was the 600,000 gold rubles that he brought “in the name of the 
Soviet government and Comintern” to finance the work of the PCI.50 
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Some of the money may even have come from the Opposition itself rather than 
the Soviet government. The Italian government through its embassy paid particular 
attention to L. T. Smilga, whom the Italian ambassador called “the Opposition’s fi-
nancier” (il finanziere dell’opposizione).51 The embassy’s concern with Smilga may 
have arisen from his role in funding the PCI.   
Neither Kamenev himself nor the funding that he provided could help the PCI in 
1927. He stood helplessly by and watched the party’s once proud L’Unita, founded 
three years earlier, face the hounding and harassment that the Opposition’s own un-
derground network of presses had experienced in the summer and fall of 1926.
52
 
The Italian newspaper appeared only twice in January and perhaps once in Febru-
ary.
53
 Its “beleaguered staff . . . worked in rapidly improvised headquarters . . . on 
the outskirts of Genoa.”54 In August the newspaper temporarily found refuge in Lu-
gano. 
Despite the PCI’s hounded existence at home in 1927, its representatives in the 
Comintern worked successfully to support the Opposition that year. Kamenev en-
couraged such support both in Rome and in Moscow. As Manzoni had warned, 
Kamenev might exploit “the sympathy of some Italian Communists for the Opposi-
tion.”55 Abroad, Kamenev found a most important ally in that endeavor. He forged 
an alliance with his fellow diplomat Christain Rakovskii, who since 1923 had 
served in Paris. Kamenev had told Trotskii in early 1926 that “‘the exile’ of Rakov-
skii in 1923 was “the first administrative repression of importance that Stalin uti-
lized to remove an opponent from the political scene.”56 Once Kamenev shared Ra-
kovsky’s fate, the two found much in common.  By the fall of 1927, the Italian em-
bassy reported, they went everywhere in Moscow together.
57
  In Europe, they met to 
plot Opposition strategy.
58
 
Several factors drew Kamenev and Rakovskii together. Kamenev had supported 
Rakovskii in the spring of 1920 when turmoil in the Ukrainian branch of the party 
had threatened his expulsion from its leadership.
59
 Rakovskii shared Kamenev’s 
long familiarity with Italian culture. He had close ties with Italian socialists before 
World War I
60
; and had been an intimate of V. V. Vorovskii, who had served ably 
for two years as Soviet representative in Italy before being assassinated. With the 
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leadership of the PCI seeking refuge in France in 1927, Kamenev would be drawn 
to the Soviet representative in that country in order to maintain contacts with Italian 
Communists across the border. Rakovskii in turn was drawn to the PCI. As one of 
Trotskii’s closest friends and collaborators, he appreciated the support that the PCI 
rendered to Trotskii in the Comintern that year.
61
 
The Executive Committee of the Comintern remained one of the last venues 
where the leaders of the Opposition could hope to speak by 1927. The foreign poli-
cy crises of that year enhanced the significance of Comintern debates. Even as am-
bassador, Kamenev was able to place himself in direct opposition to Stalin’s poli-
cies in the Comintern. In March he returned to Moscow where he repeated his in-
cendiary remarks of December. He then told the Comintern Executive Committee: 
“. . . socialist construction in the USSR will be done only with the collaboration of 
the revolutionary proletariat in other countries.”62 
More immediately, the Opposition needed the collaboration of the PCI in its 
struggle with Stalin. At the Eighth Plenum of the Comintern Executive Committee 
in May 1927, the PCI delegation skillfully defended both Zinoviev and Trotskii, 
helping to prevent their immediate expulsion from that body.
63
 The head of the PCI 
delegation, Palmiro Togliatti, told his party’s Politburo, meeting in Paris, that in 
forcing a compromise at the Eighth Plenum (Trotskii would be expelled only if he 
persisted in factional activity), “the attitude of our delegation was crucial [deter-
minante].”64 
When the Opposition went down to final defeat on the eve of the Fifteenth Party 
Congress Togliatti and the PCI finally supported the expulsions of Trotskii and Zi-
noviev from the party and the Comintern. But the PCI delegation made a “percepti-
bly softer” statement on the expulsions than the Comintern did.65 Kamenev and Ra-
kovskii, working abroad and in Moscow, had combined their efforts to encourage 
opposition sentiment in the PCI. At the same time they had forged their own politi-
cal bond. While Kamenev is best known for his partnership with Zinoviev, the con-
nection with Rakovskii proved just as important in his last open battles with  Stalin 
in the fall of 1927. Kamenev’s attempt to reach out to Rakovskii, following the 
break-up of the Opposition at the end of that year, encouraged some of his most im-
portant oppositional writing. 
Kamenev’s rapport with Rakovskii surprised no one. The same could not be said 
of his relationship with his counterpart in Moscow, Vittorio Cerruti, who replaced 
Manzoni in February 1927, shortly after Kamenev’s arrival in Rome. Some have 
suggested that the Italian government sent the conservative, anti-Bolshevik Cerruti 
to protest Kamenev’s appointment.66 If so, Cerruti soon belied expectations. He 
came to be Kamenev’s channel to the Italian government. 
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Kamenev and Cerruti 
More than a simple protest lay behind Cerruti’s appointment. His predecessor, 
Giatano Manzoni, had served as Italian ambassador in Moscow since Italy’s recog-
nition of the Soviet Union in February 1924. But by early 1927 Mussolini had lost 
patience with his ambassador’s dispatches from Moscow. “Famous for his Russo-
phile views,” Manzoni had diligently defended Kamenev’s appointment, offering 
reassurances even after Kamenev’s speech in the Comintern calling for an uprising 
of the European proletariat.
67
 Still more grievous conduct on Manzoni’s part oc-
curred over the issue of Bessarabia. Romania  had occupied it in 1918, but the So-
viet Union continued to claim it.  In September 1926 Mussolini signed an agree-
ment of friendship and cooperation with Romania, clearly an indication that he in-
tended to ratify the Bessarabian Protocol, confirming Romania’s right to Bessara-
bia. In doing so he sought greater influence in the Balkans through the new Roma-
nian leader, Gen. A. Averescu, who had been educated in Italy and regarded the 
Fascist regime “with enthusiasm.”68  
Manzoni made the counter argument. He warned Mussolini that if he took the 
next step and signed the protocol, it would “evoke the most serious crisis in Soviet-
Italian relations” and make the Duce “an enemy of the Russian people, destroying 
all previous accomplishments. . . .”69 Manzoni’s ardent defense of Russia’s interests 
in Bessarabia, followed by his support of Kamenev, impelled Mussolini to recall 
him. The appointment of Cerruti, “a conservative and convinced opponent of Soviet 
power,” appeared to signal a dramatic shift in Italian policy toward the Soviet Un-
ion.
70
 
Dino Grandi’s appointment as Deputy Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs a year earlier had already sent the same signal. Grandi, a committed Fascist 
who regarded the Soviet Union with antipathy, soon forced out his superior, Salva-
tore Contrarini. Contrarini, like Manzoni, had represented the “Slavophile” contin-
gent within the Italian foreign policy establishment. With both Manzoni and Contra-
rini gone, Kamenev faced the hostile figures of Grandi and Cerruti who threatened 
to join Mussolini in a revision of the lucrative commercial relations that had ob-
tained between the Soviet Union and Italy for the past several years. 
The Soviet government feared that Mussolini would use the threatened signing of 
the Bessarabian Protocol to announce a change in his “eastern” policy. Kamenev 
sought a meeting with the Duce to discuss the issue; instead, Grandi received him, 
hiding his anger over the ambassador’s recent contact with “a Romanian spy willing 
to sell state secrets . . . regarding Italy and her policy in the Balkans.”71 He informed 
Kamenev that Italy’s confirmation of Romania’s claim to Bessarabia was imminent. 
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As expected, Italy’s signing of the protocol in March 1927 roiled Soviet-Italian 
relations. Litvinov told his ambassador to demand an explanation from Mussolini.
72
 
Kamenev saw the hand of Britain in the decision and, agreeing with Litvinov, “in-
sisted that the response of the Soviet government be extremely sharp.”73 Only the 
month before, Britain had threatened Moscow with a rupture in trade over Soviet 
policy in China.
74
 At the same time the Soviet press had reported, “Italy’s readiness 
in the event of complications in China ‘to defend its interests in close collaboration 
with England.’”75 
Kamenev again had to settle for Grandi instead of Mussolini. Their encounter 
did not take place until July, four months after the signing of the Bessarabian Proto-
col, a lapse that signaled the chill in relations between the two countries. But by the 
time they had their “first visit after ratification of the protocol,” the atmosphere be-
tween them had improved. Grandi was pleased that Kamenev showed himself to be 
“most ostentatiously cordial.”76 The storm over the Bessarbian Protocol had passed, 
in large measure because Mussolini had conducted himself with restraint two 
months earlier when Great Britain broke diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. 
Stalin too sought to diminish confrontation. In response to the British withdrawal of 
recognition, he ordered that all Comintern and other non-diplomatic operatives be 
withdrawn from Soviet embassies, a signal that Mussolini could not fail to note 
when Soviet embassy personnel were recalled from Rome.
77
 
By the summer of 1927 with Soviet-Italian relations more stable, Kamenev re-
turned to Moscow. There, with his “totally bourgeois appearance and manner” that 
had so impressed Manzoni, he reached out to the Italian government through the 
one official willing to encourage him, namely the old guard conservative, Cerruti. In 
a relationship that could not have been predicted, Kamenev sooner acted as the em-
issary of the Opposition than of his government. He sought to convince Cerruti that 
the Opposition had a chance in the fight with Stalin. There was “dissent in the party 
organization as well as every region” of the country, Kamenev informed his Italian 
counterpart. He insisted that “there would [soon] be some sensational changes in 
Soviet politics.”78 
Cerruti took Kamenev’s accounts seriously and appeared to trust him. He also 
respected Kamenev’s expertise in trade and commercial policy which Cerruti 
shared. Kamenev’s explanation that the Opposition arose from “the difficult eco-
nomic situation” in the country the situation appealed to the Italian ambassador.     
“. . . above all there must be attention to commercial policy,” Kamenev explained.  
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“. . . precisely my thought,” Cerruti responded. He also praised Kamenev’s policy 
on trade.
79
 
Like Kamenev, Cerruti was no stranger to trade and commercial issues. He rep-
resented the interests of Fiat in Russia as much as those of his own government. He 
had strong ties to F. Marinotti, the head of Fiat and one of the leaders of CICE.
80
 
Cerruti therefore represented those Milanese industrialists who had been so im-
portant both to Mussolini’s rise and to the expansion of commercial and diplomatic 
connections with the Soviet Union. Kamenev’s policies would further the interests 
of Cerruti’s patrons. Cerruti also appreciated what he perceived to be Kamenev’s 
“political restraint,” warning that diplomatic circles believed that the Opposition 
otherwise pressed too hard. Such shared concerns and policies encouraged two very 
different figures to conduct “behind the scenes diplomacy [retroscena diplomati-
ca].”81 
Cerruti for a time accepted Kamenev’s optimistic assessment of the Opposition’s 
chances in the summer of 1927. He reported in August that Kamenev had confront-
ed Stalin and “won a great victory over” the General Secretary.82 Circumstances in 
fact were not as Cerruti had recounted. Kamenev had misinformed the Italian am-
bassador about the Opposition’s true state and his own role in its fate. In early Au-
gust Stalin attempted to expel Trotskii and Zinoviev from the Central Committee. 
Ordzhonikidze as Chairman of the Central Control Commission brokered a com-
promise that saved their positions.
83
 Cerruti reported that Kamenev’s confrontation 
with Stalin “stopped the expulsions.” The Opposition could now “speak freely at 
party gatherings and raise their own motions and counter motions.”84   
Kamenev’s “great victory” over Stalin constituted no more than a compromise 
brokered by Ordzhonikidze. Cerruti gave credence to his account of the Kamenev-
Stalin confrontation, explaining that it came “in confidence from someone who is in 
contact with members of the government party. . . .”85  Kamenev was so often at 
Cerruti’s when he was in Moscow that their familiarity began to annoy Chicherin. It 
is safe to conclude that most of what Cerruti knew about the Opposition came from 
Kamenev. 
Kamenev’s unjustified optimism and misinformation reported to Cerruti could 
not be sustained for long. As Trotskii had predicted to Ordzhonikidze in June 1927, 
“the extirpation of the Opposition was only a matter of time.”86 Through Cerruti, 
Kamenev had tried to convince an important trading partner otherwise. He insisted 
through the summer of 1927 that the Opposition enjoyed legitimacy and would tri-
umph, bringing him and his fellow triumvirs back into power. The ploy directed at 
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an envoy whose sober conservatism and anti-Soviet attitude encouraged Mussolini’s 
trust, appeared to work, ironically on the very eve of the Opposition’s collapse. Yet 
even in defeat, Cerruti continued to hold the Opposition in high regard. He regretted 
their loss because they (Kamenev and his ally Rakovskii, in particular) were the 
ones with “the necessary qualifications to represent the Soviet Union abroad.”87 
Given Cerruti’s respect for Kamenev and their closeness, the possibility exists 
that the Italian ambassador offered the Opposition advice regarding China in the 
crucial summer of 1927. Cerruti’s previous post before Moscow had been Beijing. 
The failure of Stalin’s policy in China became the Opposition’s focus following the 
Kuomintang’s massacre of Chinese Communists in May. The possibility remains 
speculative. Cerruti could hardly include word of such discussions with Opposition-
ists in his diplomatic dispatches, even if he believed in the Opposition’s superiority 
and, for a time, in its ultimate triumph. 
Kamenev cultivated one figure that summer who did provide tangible support to 
the Opposition. The writer Maksim Gor’kii shared his Italian exile. More signifi-
cantly, Gor’kii shared with Kamenev the Italian cultural circles which had long em-
braced the Russian writer. 
 
Kamenev and Gor’kii 
Like Kamenev, Gor’kii’s ties to Italy were deep and extended over several dec-
ades. Italy had twice been his place of refuge. In December 1906 he had fled Tsarist 
repression following the revolution of 1905. In October 1924 he settled there again, 
having left the Soviet Union two years earlier. 
In Gor’kii’s first sojourn abroad he resided in Capri where he forged “strong 
connections . . . with Italian creative society” and his works, published in Italian, 
“acquired fame on Italian soil.”88 Gor’kii’s presence on Capri encouraged the for-
mation of an extensive Russian colony whose influence proved so pervasive that 
even the Italian “cab drivers spoke a smattering of Russian”89   
For Gor’kii, the Capri years, ending in 1913, proved to be “a period of fruitful 
creativity. 
90
 He was grateful that Mussolini allowed him to return, even if the Duce 
did not greet him with open arms. The Russian-Italian library that Gor’kii had 
founded in Capri  was shut down, and he was forbidden to reside on the island again 
because of its past associations with Russian radicalism. He could live no closer to 
his beloved Capri than Sorrento on the main land. It was there that Kamenev visited 
the writer, traveling south from Rome. They renewed a long standing acquaintance 
and swam together off the Amalfi coast.
91
 
Kamenev, as Lenin’s emissary, had made such trips to see Gor’kii on Capri  dur-
ing the Bolshevik leader’s conflict with A. A. Bogdanov which Gor’kii tried to me-
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diate.
92
 On the eve of the October Revolution, Kamenev joined Zinoviev in warning 
of the impending coup in Gor’kii’s anti-Bolshevik newspaper, Novaia Zhizn’. After 
the revolution, with both Kamenev and Gor’kii back in Lenin’s good graces and 
Kamenev one of the most powerful figures in the new regime, they combined forces 
for the sake of Russian culture. When Gor’kii interceded on behalf of academics 
with ties to the Kadet Party who had been arrested, Kamenev “quickly promised to 
free them and to be available [to help] any time.”93 A year later in 1920, Kamenev 
collaborated with Gor’kii to make the classics of world literature available to the 
newly literate Soviet public.
94
 
Their collaboration ended under painful circumstances. In the fall of 1921, the 
Politburo ordered Gor’kii’s Famine Relief Committee disbanded because of anti-
Soviet remarks made in its meetings. Gor’kii confronted Kamenev in tears, “you 
have made of me a provacateur.”95 The wound healed; and from Sorrento in 1925 
Gor’kii wrote Bukharin to pass on “my sincere regards to . . . Rykov . . .  Dzerzhin-
skii, and . . . Kamenev. . . .”96 By 1927 Gor’kii and Kamenev could observe the sim-
ilarities in Stalin and Mussolini’s consolidation of power, as they renewed their 
friendship in exile. 
They would also be aware of the Italian scholar who had emerged as the con-
science of liberal Italy and one of Mussolini’s most formidable opponents, namely 
Benedetto Croce. Not only was Croce the most respected scholar in Italy, but he en-
joyed general acclaim along with a popular following. Under Mussolini “the study 
of Croce was so intense and widespread” among young people that the Fascist Min-
ister of Education, Giovanni Gentile, feared both to prohibit Croce’s works and to 
allow them in the curriculum.
97
 
Croce had begun as a supporter of Fascism; but by 1925, following the murder of 
the Socialist leader Matteotti and the initiation of repressive policies, he broke with 
the regime. At the time that Kamenev arrived in Rome, Croce had become “the cus-
todian of the Risorgimento liberal tradition and . . . the symbol of   . . . resistance to 
. . . Mussolini.”98 
Several factors would have drawn Kamenev to Croce. The Italian scholar now 
condemned Fascism as “one of the most radical attempts to break the Italian con-
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nection with the European intelligentsia. . . .”99 Mussolini’s dictatorship in one 
country, as Croce described it, resembled Stalin’s self-proclaimed policy of social-
ism in one country. The results were the same. Both dictators attempted to forge 
cultural isolation along with their monopoly of power. Kamenev deplored the blow 
to Russia’s integration with the West. He and Gor’kii, after all, had collaborated to 
keep European culture alive in the new Soviet state earlier in the decade. 
Croce, by 1927, had modified his harsh anti-Marxist stand. One of the founders 
of the socialist newspaper, Aventi, he, like Mussolini, who had once edited Aventi, 
had broken with socialism years before. Croce nonetheless conducted “a continuous 
dialogue” with Gramsci.100 By the mid-1920s, his “criticism of socialism” was 
“sharp but respectful.”101 He offered “an almost Marxist interpretation of fascism on 
one occasion.”102 In 1927 Croce’s new edition of his essays on Marxism deleted the 
sarcasm of an earlier edition.
103
 
Such facts suggest that Kamenev and Croce would have found few if any barriers 
to a meeting. Gor’kii could have arranged it. He may have encountered Croce in his 
first exile. The historian had long resided in Naples, not far from Capri. In Sorrento, 
Gor’kii would have been a short ride across the Gulf of Naples from Croce, who 
continued to reside in Naples, a mere 50 kilometers away. Even if he and Kamenev 
never met, Croce’s ideas and example were close at hand. 
Significantly, 1927 proved to be one of Croce’s most prolific periods of opposi-
tional writing. In that year he completed his History of Italy, 1870-1915. The work 
which appeared in January 1928 created an instant sensation. In it he had success-
fully “defended liberal Italy from the denigrations of fascism.”104 Through a work of 
scholarship, Croce had produced “a political protest” against Mussolini.105 Croce’s 
friend, Giacchino Volpe, was more dubious about such a purpose. He termed it “an 
historical document of the years in which it appeared [rather] than . . . a . . . recon-
struction with historical value.”106 For Kamenev the message was nonetheless clear. 
The past could serve the political purposes of the present. 
Croce employed another historical period to condemn the Duce. In reviews for 
his journal La Critica, he suggested that Mussolini was a new Prince, as deceitful 
and conniving as Machiavelli’s Renaissance sovereign.107 Kamenev later observed 
Stalin’s resemblance to Machiavelli’s protagonist. Kamenev, it should be noted, 
was no stranger to Machiavelli. In Siberian exile he introduced Stalin to The 
Prince.
108
 Croce in the 1920s wrote extensively on the similarities between twenti-
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eth century dictators and their sixteenth-century Florentine predecessor, a compari-
son that Kamenev would have readily appreciated. If Kamenev and Croce met, they 
would surely have discussed the latter’s work in progress, the History of Italy as 
well as his extensive writing on Machiavelli. If they did not meet, Kamenev could 
not have avoided awareness of Croce’s role as the moral and intellectual embodi-
ment of opposition to Mussolini. 
Unlike Croce, who in secret encouraged conspiratorial activity against the Duce, 
Kamenev returned to Moscow in September and threw caution to the winds. In 
company with Rakovskii, he denounced Stalin at rallies and meetings in the weeks 
before the tenth anniversary of the revolution. His recall became inevitable. 
Chicherin informed Cerruti in mid-November that the ambassador “had completely 
lost the trust of the Soviet government.”109 The official termination of Kamenev’s 
diplomatic appointment occurred on December 12, 1927.
110
 
 
Conclusion 
Past and present assessments of Kamenev’s role as ambassador are mixed. A 
critical observer in the Italian Foreign Ministry claimed that “Kamenev found no 
sympathy in Italian government or diplomatic circles,” because of membership in 
“the ultra left opposition.”111 The Russian scholar of Italy, I. A. Khormach, has sug-
gested that replacing Kamenev with D. I. Kurskii “rendered a beneficial influence 
on the stable development of Soviet-Italian relations.”112 To Khormach, as to the 
Italian government, Kamenev had been sooner an Oppositionist than a diplomat. 
Mussolini, who deplored Kamenev’s appointment in the first place, upon meeting 
the new ambassador, had damned him with faint praise: He was at least more intel-
ligent than Kirzhentsev, his predecessor, observed the Duce.
113
 
Those who knew Kamenev best provided a very different assessment. To Cerruti, 
Kamenev was someone “enlivened by good will” and competent “to represent the 
Soviet Union abroad.”114 He could pay Kamenev no higher compliment than to take 
him as his source on Soviet domestic politics. Chicherin in turn told Cerruti how 
much he had come to appreciate Kamenev’s “words . . . measured and unbiased . . . 
and his reports . . . so interesting on the growth of Fascism.”115 
In making such reports, Kamenev must have noted the numerous parallels be-
tween Stalin and Mussolini. Stalin became General Secretary of the party in the 
same year that Mussolini came to power in Rome. The Duce consolidated his power 
in 1925-1928, using a process of repression that began with the murder of Matteotti. 
Stalin began to move against Kamenev and Zinoviev in 1925. The Matteotti affair 
nearly destroyed Mussolini. Lenin’s Testament, which termed Stalin “too rude,” 
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could have done the same to the General Secretary. It became an issue in the party 
at the same time that Matteotti was murdered. The hounding of the banned PCI, 
which Kamenev observed in Rome, painfully resembled Stalin’s repeated assaults 
against the Opposition in 1926-1927. The cult of Stalin mirrored that of Mussolini. 
Both phenomena emerged in the press of their respective countries in the mid-
1920s.
116
 
Such comparisons would bring Kamenev back to Croce, who so skillfully inter-
preted Italian history to condemn Mussolini. Volpe’s observation that Croce’s His-
tory of Italy constituted “an historical document of the years in which it appeared     
. . . ,”117 found an echo in Kamenev’s biography of Chernyshevskii, that appeared 
nine months after Croce’s work: “We must study Chernyshevskii not so much for 
what he tells us about his time, as for what he tells us about our own,” Kamenev 
wrote in the introduction.
118
 
Upon his return from Rome, Kamenev and his allies entered into an open con-
frontation with the Stalinist majority. The triumvirate was expelled from the party 
and soon split apart. Trotskii and his supporters condemned Kamenev and Zinoviev 
for seeking to regain admission to the party. They chose exile rather than compro-
mise with Stalin. Rakovskii’s own wilderness years were spent in Astrakhan’ and 
Saratov, the very places to which Chernyshevskii had been consigned over sixty 
years earlier. 
Berefit of politics, Kamenev in 1928 turned to literary criticism and biography. 
He had assumed the role of Croce, producing veiled yet trenchant criticism of Stalin 
just as Croce did of Mussolini. In his accounts of Chernyshevskii, the leftist martyr 
of Tsarism became a symbol for the martyrdom of the Left Opposition to Stalin. In 
recounting Chernyshevskii’s experience in exile, Kamenev attempted to reach out to 
Rakovskii, languishing where Chernyshevskii had once been confined. He com-
bined the Aesopian tradition of Russian radicalism with the creation of a contempo-
rary past which Croce had perfected. 
The Italian scholar’s use of Machiavelli encouraged Kamenev to employ The 
Prince as a source of historical analogies as well as a practical guide to politics. His 
speech to the Seventeenth Party Congress in 1934 made a veiled comparison be-
tween the new Prince and the old. Kamenev repeated the comparison in the intro-
duction to the works of Machiavelli which he published as head of the Academia 
publishing house that same year. Both the speech to the party congress and the di-
rectorship of Academia were made possible by Gor’kii, who intervened with Stalin 
on Kamenev’s behalf.119 Gor’kii understood the role that Kamenev could play as a 
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“literary oppositionist,” having observed Croce’s success (and survival) under simi-
lar oppressive circumstances. 
In sum, Kamenev’s brief appointment as Soviet ambassador to Rome cannot be 
branded as irrelevant or a failure. He managed to convince the hard nosed, con-
servative Cerruti of the significance of the Opposition and for a time of its potential 
as well. Even Cerruti lamented the Opposition’s defeat in November 1927. Kame-
nev forged a close bond with Gor’kii, whose protection and intercession made it 
possible for him to recreate in the Soviet Union the example of Croce in Italy. 
Kamenev learned in Rome that it was better to work for Stalin’s defeat in the role of 
a Croce than as a Gramsci, languishing in interminable confinement. Unfortunately, 
Kamenev ended neither as a Croce nor a Gramsci, but as a Matteotti. He had none-
theless turned a brief diplomatic exile into a foundation on which to build the rest of 
his political career. 
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